Users can compare fingerprints, and if all clients in a conversation are verified, this in indicated in the UI with a blue shield. According to the whitepaper, these assets are stored basically indefinitely (as opposed to when all clients have downloaded the attachment). This means that clients do not need to upload the same potentially large file many times encrypted to different participants. The servers gets just one copy of the encrypted file and a message as usual for each participant. The key and SHA-256 of the ciphertext are then encrypted for each participant. #Wire for mac decrypting messages update#This is more similiar to how Sesame works in Signal, compared to Signal groups v1, as the server is keeping track of group participants, which clients update to.įor large file attachments, senders generate a symmetric key and encrypt the file using AES-CBC-256 with PKCS#5 padding. Clients keep track of which participants are in a conversation, and learn from the server when they need to update. If the sender did not include messages for all participants, the server rejects the batch. Senders encrypt a message to all members of a group (“conversation” in Wire) for every participant and send in a batch to the server. The primitives Wire uses are ChaCha20, HMAC-SHA256, and Curve25519, with HKDF for key derivation. The Wire whitepaper makes no mention of signing this prekey though.
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